# Kurd Ethno Nationalism in Turkey; A Contemporary Analysis

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## Abstract

*This article answers a historic puzzle: why the military defeat of the insurgent PKK (Partiyah Karkere in Kurdistan), who renounced the secession target, and whose leader was under Turkish arrest, re-established his forces when there were in Turkey unparalleled opportunities to settle the Kurdish problem peacefully? The PKK's radicalization in Turkey at a time triggered by the EU undermines the common claim that promoting democracy will alleviate ethnic conflict problems. Failure to provide information based on asset mobilization, mechanisms of political incentives, and mental framing. The article argues that democratization is inevitable as long as it brings in a competitive eye against the insurgent organization's democratic dominance of its ethnic electoral district. The survival of the business requires a radicalization rather than compromise under the market conditions.*

*As long as the organization of the insurgent mobilization is successful, democratization is not a panacea for violent conflict. The results show that analysis of the insurgency recruitment micro-level dynamics would lead to better understanding of the management of ethnic conflicts. Data come from a variety of sources, including ethnographic fieldwork, quantitative statistical analysis (i.e., spatial and ecological clustering), and systematic interpretation of original documents.*

**Keywords:** Democracy, Ethnic Conflict, Kurds, Moderation, HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi/People's Labour Party), PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), KCK (Unions of Communities in Kurdistan), BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi/Peace and Democracy Party), DTK (Democratic Society Congress)

## Introduction

The solution and basically question of this theory is to investigate the conversion of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) conversion into Kurdh Unions of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK).  In Northern Kurdistan/ South-Eastern Turkey, a big challenge of Kurdish national battle is launched. The main idea of this research is to record and clarify this multi-dimensional battle from one dimensional form.  According to my view, this Kurdish national battle from political dispute turned into multi-dimensional development. This postulation contend change achieved another model which is idea of majority rule self-sufficiency an another option for country show in Turkey. Thus, postulate explore causes of these changes.

As it is evident, that straightforward inquiries are very difficult. This prosposal requires nu many results and ward inquires to design an appropriate solution to primary inquiry. Like, how chronicled factors have

influenced the Kurdish group battle by procedure of change and national battle? The change of KCK from PKK institutional incident speak to something more profound in the manners of Kurdish local battle from a comprehension about matteras asked by social measurement too? Has Kurdish battled we have discussed transformed from absolutely political achievement of outfitted battle to look for a Kurdish separate place to economic development advancing ethno-national self-sufficiency? Is the change as yet continuous? Or on the other hand are Kurds as yet battling with an indistinguishable he attitudes from they managed in most recent century? Why these political activism turned social activism and socially related things into suspicious points by KCK?

The PKK flopped in accomplishing its targets through an absolutely political battle, a postulation obviously propose that response to these inquiries. The Kurdish national battle merged into the KCK, with this disappointment. It grounds that the KCK, not at all like the PKK, conveyed on social and social improvement and procedures in that advanced Kurdish country working with regards to the Turkish state instead of equipped battle as the main reaction to build up a self-ruling and sovereign Kurdish country state. Keeping in mind the end goal to better comprehend the succession of the entire procedure of change of this Kurdish national battle. An assortment of contents, will analyze how these variations goes to fruition. Like creation of choices in places like KRG in Southern Iran. These variations occur in Turish and Kurdish governmental contemporary districts.

Accordingly, in 21st Century KCK reflected different variations in importance and routine analysis in Kurdish National Battle in Turkey.

**Background of the Study**

Early Kurdish nationalist had its fundamental establishments in the hours of the Stool Area, inside which Kurds were a basic ethnic social event. With the breaking down of the Footstool Area, the Kurdish-bigger part areas were isolated between the as of late confined different states of Iraq, Turkey and Syria including Kurds as minority of known meaning of each state. Kurdish nationalist were all time doing their best to make these states of Iraq and Syria, confined from the fear of losing of district of future indepedant Kurdistan.

After some time it has come to noticed that Shia Kurds of Iran shown no energy toward Kurdish Patriosim, in the form of totally free independence and rejected these though vigorously, losing the hold of patriotes in strict organization of Tehran. In 1970s Iraqi Kurds have provided 182000 Kurd butcher for slaughter houses in Anfal slaughter houses. These places have no accommodation for these independence movements.

In 1991, the NATO maintained Iraqi Kurds areas as no fly zones due to heavy shelling on Saddam Hussein's Army, by making them insufficient to attack the central Iraqi government and administrations. In 2003 assault of Iraq evacuated Saddam Hussain, Iraqi Kurds state transformed into a self-administering region, valuing an unfathomable proportion of self-organization yet keeping down before full opportunity.

The word Kurdistan implies the land where the Kurds live. Be that as it may, presently days it's the image of the separatists of the Kurds in the district of the Center East, needing separate nation of their own via cutting out pieces from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Because of its nationalism, the Kurds need the opportunity to impress the desiresof the outside

powers unwittingly into the political body of the Mussulmen group.

The local individuals of Kurdistan, numbered around one million, have, for quite a long time, been griping of minimization. Peace circumstance is more regrettable than the most exceedingly awful conceivable and numerous an adolescent is presently playing in the hands of the individuals who need to destabilize Islamic states. Famous administration is distanced and individuals of Kurdistan are least coordinated with the remainder of the nation.

The Kurds are Muslim tribesman who lives close by the hilly district where the outskirts of Iran meet with the turkey and Iraq and around where the boondocks turkey meet with those Syria and Iraq. In this manner the Kurdish people groups are isolated and split with pieces between the four sovereign freedom conditions of Iran Iraq, turkey and Syria. In Religion a Kurds is a Sunni Mussalman, however in barely any spots like Turku Iranian outskirt and in out of reach slopes of the north-Iraq around Rwanda Erbil and Amedia and there are scarcely any towns where the Kurds watching solid Shia organization. The Kurds individuals have a lot number of holy people and warriors (baba yadgar, and Salah – Ud clamor Ayubi) (slah udin of campaigns are) are two instances of a rundown of the Kurdish and holy people warriors. It is a difficult to give careful number of the figures of the Kurdish populace. Yet, gauge it's to Kurdish populace put aggregate around 30-35 million, partitioned about the four locale sovereign autonomy nations of the turkey Iran Iraq and Syria. Turkey 10-14 million, Iraq 6.4-7.8 million, Iran 6.1-6.5 million, and Syria being 2.1-2.4 million. The place that is known for Kurdistan is celebrated in the details of their

topography, minerals assets even on the traditions and people legend of the Kurds. The world acclaimed oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk happen to be in the Kurdish nation.

Contemporary Kurdish Movement in Turkey[20]



## Theoretical/Conceptual Framework:

In this research paper the Primordialism theory of nationalism is to be applied.

According to this theory, nations are considered as natural prehistorical phenomena. In context of ethnicity, primordialism claims that "ethnic communities and nationalities exist as there are traditions of belief and action on primordial artifacts such as the biological factors and particularly on land."

From primordialist point of view, the incompatible cultural, customs, languages and socio economical differences of Kurds in Iraq was the major cause of Kurd nationalism in Turkey as they reflected phrases about the

justice of their homeland. In addition, various cultural identities in this particular region have led to the Kurdish question in this regard.

**History of Kurds**

After Arabs, Turksand Persians, Kurds are the largest ethnic country in the Middle East. The Kurdish population is not accurate in Near East but around 30-35 million people, theKurds live around Zagros mountains in the north central Middle East, situated between Iran's plateau and nations over a total of around 75000-100 000 square miles, in modern-day southeastern Turkey, in northern Iraq, west Iran and northeastern Syria. There are statistics showing that 14.7 million Kurds make up 18% of Turks and about 5.5 million make up 17.5% of Iraqis and 8.1 million make up about 10% of Iranians.Historians generally agree that the Iranian branch of the Indo-European Race included the Kurds, who were later occupied by the Seldhuk Turks in the early 13th century. The Kurds have languages written by Northern Kurds and Sorani and the Kurds of South Kurdistan. Two major languages. (Izzdy, 1992) There is a commonality among both Balochi and Kurdish, and a Balochi community and there iscommonalities between Kurdish languages, and among Baloch in Pakistan there is a tribe called Kurd. Roughly 75% of the Kurds practice Sunni Islam, while up to 15% follow Shiite Islam. Small numbers of Kurds are also Jews, Christians and Zoroasters. (Eppel, 2016) Kurds sporadically sparked a very low-intensity revolt in the Ottoman and Persian realms against the central authorities. However it was not exclusively in the First World War (WW-I), the ideology of the Kurds began to shrivele. (Munir, 2016). Kurdish National Party Abdulkader Shamidinaan and Paris-based General Shareef Pashha, who led Paris Peace Conference in 1919, proposed an independent

Kurdish state, but the main obstacle to secession remained a lack of unity and infighting among local Kurdish representatives. In 1920, the Treaty of Sevres between Allies and Ottoman Turkey resolved to create a Kurdish independent state based on Turkish, Syria and Iraqi controlled regions under Kurdish control.

The next proposal for autonomy for the mostly Turkish territory situated east of the Euphrates, south of Armenia and north of Turkish boondock with Syria and Mesopotamia will be drawn up by Britain, France and Italy. Article 64 notes that if, within one year from its entry into force, Kurdish people communities are to be granted access within the areas defined by Article 62.

Nevertheless, by giving control on the Anatolian peninsula including the Kurdish territories, the Treaty of Lausanne concluded in July 1913 repealed the Treaty of Severs in favour of the formation of a modern nation-state. The defeat in Turkey of the 1925 Kurdish-led Sheik Saad uprising culminated in the migration of Turkey in 1925 with more Kurds to Syria.In July 1937, the Saadabad Treaty signed by Turkey, Persia, Irak and Afghanistan made it clear that, while there was no specific mention of Kurds in this Agreement, Turkey, Iran and Iraq should collaborate in the repression of subversive activities of Kurds. In Kurdistan, a number of Kurds deny Turkey a core term like' South East' or' East' (Jongerden 2007: 30;

**Kurds in Turkey**

The Turkish Kurds mean people of Kurdish descent who are raised or living in Turkey. The Kurds constitute Turkey's largest ethnic minority. We make up 15% to 20% of the Turkish people, according to different estimates. Kurds in several Turkish regions, but mostly in the sub eastern

and eastern part of region, within the Kurdish region, are seen as Turkish Kurdistan.



According to establishment of Turkey state in 1923, massacres have occurred on the Kurds regularly, namely two distinct groups the Zilan massacre and Dersim ethnocide. The government of Turkishtill 1991 recognized Kurds as 'MountainTurks' and the Turkish government outlawed the terms' Kurdes' or' Kurdistan' in any language while' Kurdish' could be used in census records. In 1980, the consequences of military coups includes official banned on Kurdish language in different public and private places. There were arrested and imprisoned a lot of those who are very fond of Kurdish language either in form of singing and writing or speaking. The public and private schools are not allowed to speak  in Kurdish languages in Turkey.Only in some schools is the Kurdish language permitted as a subject.

Since the 1980's, the Kurdish revolution has included peaceful political acts on the Kurdish basic rights, both armed forces and hiding terrorist which has primarily targeted Turkish military installations, first seeking an independent Kurdish state and then Kurdish self-determination. 60% of Turkish self-confidential Kurds agree in Turkey that the Kurds are not aiming for a separate state (while 71.3% of Turks self-identified do).

Mother and child of Kurdish descent, Van, Turkey.

In 1973 eatingrestrictions were imposed at time of Kurdish conflict in rural and urban areas of Turkey. Most Kurds were forcibly expelled by Turkish security forces from their homes. Several settlements have supposedly been incendiated or burned. Political parties serving Kurdish values were outlawed many years of 1990s and at beginning of 2000s. The conflict began successfully in 2013, with the ongoing tensions among two known groups of PKK and Turkey's establishment at time of June 2015, in Syrian Civil War.

Violence towards regular Kurdish civilians was widely reported and masses of people targeted the offices of people's rights democracy party at different locations.

**Kurdish legislative parties**

Eight recent political parties have been created, the newest being the HDP and the DBP in Kurdistan, in 1990 first Kurdish Parliamentary HEP (People's Labor Party) was being founded. The Constitutional Court also outlawed most of the former groups on the grounds that they were in violation of the Constitution and the Act for the Republic of Turkey,

because they threatened national unity and territorial integrity, and that they were supposedly in favour of the PKK (Celep 2014: 385).

Watts argues that "although it's wrong to say that the parties are the same, the pro-Kurdish parties mostly have not split or changed their policies and displayed many of the same features provided by HEP" (2010:69). The history of the HDP therefore is that of the alliance between the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Party / Peace and Democracy Party) and the former Kurdish party and a number of small leftist parties, syndicates and campaigns, which have been put together by the HDK (Halkların Demokratik Kongress). A segment would review three main characteristics of these Kurdish parties: their backgrounds, their State perceptions, political prospects and persecution.

Secondly, the Turkish Parliamentary System has created the HEP. It is known as second parliamentary party, in continuation of Kemalist parliamentary tradition, after 1987. The founding members of this party are mostly Kurds and did not start as Kurdish part due to same reason. It gradually started to focus the Kurds on progressive problems and several Turks fell from the party (Watts 2010: 63–65). Democratic Parliamentary Party Repression. Government Repression. Although Turkish Constitutional Court (e.g. Refah) has outlawed parties with different ideological orientations, Kurdish groups were unnecessarily prohibited (Celep 2014: 386). The constantly barring parties "not only permitted the party to take part in the political system, but also empowered the state with the power to seize the financial properties of the group and deprived any of the legislative members of the party" (Watts 2010: 98).

Many of its leading figures have been jailed and electoral politics have been stopped from undertaking the task, which has taken away the parties

the professional support they require. The targets included from the local leaders of political parties to the national lawmaker, such as Mehmet Sincar (DEP assassinated for the town of Batman, 1993) and the Kurdish political parties (Van Bruinessen, 1996). It is evident that there is severe restriction in institutional openings and legitimate involvement in politics. Votes nonparties are then redeployed to the next biggest party – an incent ive to sit for the major competitors of the Kurdish forces, who were the AKP and its successors since the mid-1990s (O' Connor / Baser, next). In 1995, the HADEP(PDP) received just 4.3% and the DEHAP (Democratic People's Party) obtained 6.2% of the votes in 200 polls.

## PKK-Kurdish Political Parties Alliance

Since the end of the 1990s, ties between the PKK and the Party are marked by periods of close cooperation, conflicts at certain points and re-configured power balance with the uprising. Unlike Sínn Féin's abstention politics in Westminster or Herri Batasuna's role on the Spanish Parliament in the presence of an official Kurdish group in Turkey's general parliament, the PKK had never protested. (Tezcur 2015: 77;. The PKK was growing in 1990 and did not consider any new political party members to have threatened its hegemonic role in Kurdish politics. At a period when in the late eighties the PKK was undermined militarily, the benefits of a relationship with the parties that did not antagonism were understood. Nevertheless, the parties have never referred to the PKK and always opposed it highly wisely for insurgents.

While Nicole Watts ' book (2010) is definitely Kurdish legislative policy's most definitive account, it separates itself from her portrayal of party ties with the PKK marked by utter intimidation. Throughout chapter 4 her novel, she states that DEP has been compelled to postpone the 1994

municipal elections by the state from the one side and the PKK from the other.The PKK called for a boycott of the elections and threatened violence with the party which took part, but not specifically the relation of the boycott of the DEP with the PKK proposal. In retrospect, the blessing was probably a mistake because it helped the Refah group (the predecessor of the AKP) to attain an electoral footing in the area and robbed the Kurdish movement of its local governance capital (Watts 2010: 109).

The same is valid for the fact that (at least as the Author knows) although it has no documentation of an offensive Kurdish parliamentary party assault against its leaders (H. Elections Hatip Dicle as President of the DEP Group marked a change towards greater support for the PKK, particularly since the seventy years (Watts 2010: 69, HASEP Leader) violence has traditionally been used against Kurdish movements.

Despite efforts to separate the Parties from the PKK, the idea that the PKK had at times little impact on the actions of the Parties would be very foolish to acknowledge. The group wanted to present a local popular former Kawa activist Mehmet Polat in municipal elections during which he was nearly certain to have been elected in 1999, when it preferred the DEHAP nominee (national and regional) for the city of Adıyaman.

The PKK therefore called him to serve at national elections in which, because of the decline of DEHAP in the electoral district, it was extremely unlikely that he would have been chosen. One local source has reported that the PKK has forsaken almost a certain municipal seat in Kawa for a waste of effort on a regional basis. For the municipal elections in 2014 Öcalan overrode the chosen party procedure and indicates that a woman is running in Mardin for Syria (Güsten 2014), which means that she is running a female Syrian nominee.While a struggle to increase Kurdish

minority political participation, it affirms that the PKK or its chief can at least control the party. After Suruç's attacks, HDP co president Demirtaş requested in an interview with the Financial Times that "the PKK stop fighting Turkey" in August2015. The remarks were that the YDG-H14 had captured many urban centers in Kurdistan and PKK had justuncontrolled its caveat (Tekdemir 2016:658). They were a semi autonomous Youth Group in the PKK.In an interview with Demirtaş Senior PKK Commander Duran Kalkan asked: "Who is he, what did he do?"(Hebrews 2015)." After the HDP's surprising electoral success, in June, the KKC issued a declaration saying"[ we] will openly state that we are primarily concerned about the issue of the PKK giving up its armed struggle toward Turkey. All must realize that the HDP is not a PKK legal party.In 2014, Cemil Bayık, another senior PKK figure, suggested that labor was unprecedentedly divided into the movement when he said that tensions exist within the motion, but that these tensions are much more diffuse than the armed movement, versus the cleavage of the political party. The Kurdish Parties and the PKK have been found not to be integrated structurally. Sırrı Sakık is the brother of leader Śemdin Sakık of the PKK, who is a founding DEP member and elected mayor of Agan. His son was going to the mountains after his prison directly Abdullah Demirbaş clarified.These direct family ties exist in Kurdish politics on the higher levels but are diminished by tens of thousands of direct ties on the grassroots scale between insurgents and their families. There is, therefore, a micro-level articulation of that relationship, connecting politicians ' brothers and guerrilla sisters, when one tries to assess the balance of power between the Kurdish parties and the PCK. The PKK quickly realized the utility of thickening the Kurdish conflict and it knew that the complexity

of the PKK' s alliance retained its credibility in the eyes of more militant kurds.An Istanbul ERNK Commander claimed that after a period of insurgency for a PKK-friendly resistance, whether one escapes prisons, one must eventually choose between becoming undercover either in the mountains as an insurgent, or in full time as a full-time ERNK member or taking up legal political parties.Nevertheless, the change from a profession as a rebel PKK activist to participation in bureaucratic party politics or from illicit activity is characterized by a clear split. Their guerrilla profession is an all-embracing full-time commitment for PKK administrators (for starters, they are not allowed to marry or have partners) and eliminates any chance of mixing liberal politics with both. His family moved to Istanbul to separate a PKK sympathizer from Adıyaman with his efforts to join the PKK with some school friends from the PKK.As a young refugee, there was no political interaction in Istanbul with the PKK, but the HADEP office in the Gaziosmanpaşa neighborhood started and relations were restored with PKK leaders by means of people he met.17 The legitimate parties had also provided access for the rebels of the Kurds to a variety of symbolic and material resources. Kurdish leaders ' presence in the country has also emphasized the Kurdish conflict in the international arena and has helped to build unity ties to foreign civil society (Watts 2010).Although the armed wing of the Kurdish cause was not automatically channeled to these weapons, the wider political war was definitely enhanced. Theoretical change Following its distinct origins, further theoretical integration between the PKK and political parties has been witnessed over the last decade; the PKK has expressly dropped the claim for an independent state.

**KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union)**

The PKK itself demanded a full rebuilding as a part of this revolutionary theoretical change, which represented a shift from the conventional Leninist paradigm of the Armed Avant-garde to a more hierarchical model in which the guerilla movements in turn aim only to defend, rather than guide, the larger movement. In 2005 after six years of dysfunctional organisations the PKK was taken into KCK.18 It is a multi-layered network of 19 "participated in the set-up of the local councils (at the level of the town, the region, the city),' people's courts.'The Commission on Languages and Education responsible for the introduction of Kurdish as a written language initiatives "(Casier / Jongerden / Walker 2011: 114). The KCK has the mission most critical, not only as a logistical adjunct to the resistance war, but also to introduce democratic confederalism (Casier / Jongerden-Walker 2011: 114). Although the military components of the KCK are placed on the same continuum as non violent efforts at an ideational stage, it seems impossible that the prerogatives of armed combat will not dominate over the short time historical imperative of the armed struggle contrasted with the that mobilization of civil society.

**Grassroots Mobilization**

Importantly, Kurdish legitimate political groups do not protect unconstitutional KCK. In another organisation, the DTK, established by a parliamentary party through 2007 the legislative elements of the Kurdish motion are not only a different organization, but also part of the effort to forge new democratic paradigms, identified by the immediate and continuing exercise of people's power across communities, towns and municipalities. the DTK is a modern umbrella organization. In 2011, the DTK officially agreed to the adoption of the political autonomy

mechanisms and activities (DTK 2011).It reiterated its pledge to political sovereignty by issuing the "Declaration of Political Resolution on Self-Regulation" in December 2015, at the height of urban conflict between YDG-H youth activists and the Turkish security forces. "As DTK, we embrace the declarations of self-governance of popular assemblies and the legitimate popular opposition in every area. It is important for us to support and continue this struggle as part of the fight for democracy and freedom, the Kurdish community and all the communities of Turkey "(HDP 2016).The PKK and KCK have backed this argument (Biehl 2016). Furthermore, while the DTK is not directly connected to the PKK, the concept of its council overlaps with current KCK councils and it demonstrated unity with members of the insurgency such as the YDG-H engaged in violent confrontations with the security forces.

**Democratic Society Congress (DTK)**

The DTK holds two yearly General Meetings with the participation of 501 delegated members, 301 elected local councils in 43 counties and 200 delegates elected through the conventional municipal elections, with a number of placed in the presence of religious and ethnic minorities, as well as other civil society organisations. (Egret / Anderson 2016: 43). The DTK argues that its organizational model will "create the community's democracy and permit participation, pluralism and direct democracy to exist next to the state" (DTK 2011: 7).

In 2011 Congress, the DTK declared that it will be vigorously enforcing t he democracy to resolving the specific needs of its DTK territory (Hurriy et Daily News 2011), as the DBP controlled several Kurdish communities , promoting the concrete recognition and illustrating the democratic confe derality.

Although there is no doubt that municipal authority in Turkey is extremely limited, the State had indirectly funded the Democratic Confederalism project of the Kurdish movementSubmitted to the Turkish State by the Democratic Confederalism Body for women concrete approaches that have already been ignored or abused by them make them understand the theoretical ideas in the Kurdish movement's initiative (Tatort Kurdistan 2013: 135–139). The reciprocal effects on both sides and civic groups, until constitutional confederalization was introduced by the Kurds ' legislative parties under the aegis of the DTK.A HDP reaction clarified that this was a massive usurpation of the electoral values, referring to a total of 58.5% of the popular vote for the deposed DBP mayor with 39.08% of the lower vote, and 81.61% of the highest vote (HDP 2016).

**Research Method** - **Qualitative Versus Quantitative Techniques**

A descriptive research was conducted in order to meet the goals of the thesis. Highly suitable for small samples, although its effects are not observable and quantifiable, is the key characteristic of qualitative research. The essential benefit is also to offer a complete definition and interpretation of a field of research, without limiting the scope of inquiry and existence of respondent reactions, as it also reflects the fundamental difference from quantitative research (Collis & Hussey, 2003).

**Ethno-Symbolic Account of Turks' Homeland Claims**

This chapter discusses the assurances of the Turkish Patriots with a view to contributing to a better understanding of the different country views formed by the national Turkish and Kurdish cases. Just like the Kurds, the arguments of the Turks are based on legitimate land relations (primordialism) and the possibility of nationalism (innovation).

**Turkish Nationalists' Territorial Homeland Claims**

Kurdish patriots are affirming three ownership of Kurdistan locally in Turkey, as was explained in the previous section. In order to show the difficulty of regulating the Kurdish locality, an ethno symbolistic document of the Turkish country guarantees will be applied to the accompanying page.

**Primordialist Claim: Turks are the First Owners of Anatolia**

The most common name of the Turkish Republic's geographical region is Anatolia. Hitite documents are the timeliest sources of geographical names in Anatolia. In these Hitite articles, 28 words are recognized30, referring to Anatolia's political and managerial framework. It is also evident that these terms were used from 1800-1500 BC and eventually replaced by various names. The description of pre-Byzantine Anatolia, as Georgia, Armenia and Messopotamiea, is by Amasiyali strabon (64-21 BC).

**Pioneer Claim: Kurds don't frame a brought together country**

The Kurdish patriots ' final statement is that Kurds build a nation and like each other, have the right of a land plot and its own state. And now, I believe the views of Van Bruinessen on the Kurdish nation are worthy of mention. Answer from Van Bruinessen to the survey, "Is there a Kurdish country?" In light of the area and the guest, distinctive gatherings and diverse factions used to be called Kurdish. This was done so as to separate these individuals from Turks and other Ottoman nationals… The term Kurd was utilized to address the individuals who talked the Kurmanc tongue, instead of the individuals who talked the Zaza or southern lingos… On the other hand, a few faction culinary experts (and some of the time the group all in all), contended that their inceptions were Arab. These contentions were substantial at times and invalid in others" (Bruinessen,

1992:358). Van Bruinessen visits this issue in another article and contends that "Without question, the Kurds never constituted a homogenous gathering and this is as yet the case" (Bruinessen 1992, pp.358). The elements that drove Bruinessen to these conclusions are as per the following:

"Villagers who don't have a place with a tribe are either isolated from their families by weight or else have diverse ethnic foundations. Political and monetary conditions decided the force and heading of this exchange… Powerful tribes controlled some weaker tribe-like gatherings, much the same as needy villagers. Then again, new tribes showed up around fruitful pioneers" (Bruinessen 1992, pp.358-359).

The chronicled and political systems of Van Bruinessen also created feudalism and thus the "kurdish" meetings. At that time the racial base of the rallies under command never again changed the dominant group, for it was all they needed to find new military units.

The diversity of Kurdish gatherings is shown in this fact. As Bruinessen said, the absorbed assemblies understood that Armenians, Nestors or Jacobites were actually Armenians (Bruinessen, 1992:147, 150).

**Conclusion**

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