

## **Pakistan's as US Sceptic State**

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### **Abstract**

*After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, most of Al-Qaeda's top leadership fled to Pakistan's tribal areas, particularly to North and South Waziristan. Al-Qaeda started using these rugged and mountainous areas to recruit, train, and equips its members to attack the United States homeland and its forces in Afghanistan with the help of the local people. One of the key objectives of the United States' re-engagement with Pakistan after 9/11 was to strategically defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Before 9/11, Pakistan was under the United States' economic and military sanctions due to the nuclear explosion in May 1998 and military coup in October 1999. The United States had made seven demands of Pakistan about Al-Qaeda. Pakistan's responses to the United States' demands against Al-Qaeda are ranked more satisfactory than cooperation on Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The key factor that did not allow meeting the US demands in totality in the war against the Taliban and AL-Qaeda was Pakistan policy elite's suspicions of the US commitment to Afghanistan.*

**Key Words:** Sceptics, Al-Qaeda, military operations, Pakistan's army

### **Introduction**

After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, most of Al-Qaeda's top leadership fled to Pakistan's tribal areas, particularly to North and South Waziristan (9/11 Commission, 2004). Al-Qaeda started using these rugged and mountainous areas to recruit, train, and equips its members to attack the United States homeland and its forces in Afghanistan with the help of the local people. According to 9/11 Commission Report, "Within Pakistan's borders are 150 million Muslims, scores of al-Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters, and –perhaps-Osama Bin Ladin" (9/11 Commission,

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2004). The Bush administration demanded from Pakistan the removal of Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in FATA in order to establish its writ on its territory, or the United States would destroy them unilaterally. According to the White House, "Once we have identified and located the terrorists, the United States and its friends and allies will use every tool available to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy their capacity to conduct act of terror" (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003, p.17).

One of the key objectives of the United States' re-engagement with Pakistan after 9/11 was to strategically defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Obama, 2009). Before 9/11, Pakistan was under the United States' economic and military sanctions due to the nuclear explosion in May 1998 and military coup in October 1999 (Markey, 2013). At the time of 9/11, the Chief of Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the ISI, happened to be in New York, giving a briefing to the United States' Congressmen on Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Musharraf, 2006)(2008, p. 69). The United States had made seven demands of Pakistan about Al-Qaeda. Pakistan's responses to the United States' demands against Al-Qaeda are ranked as satisfactory in comparison to Pakistani cooperation against the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

### **Literature Review**

Those currently generating literature concerning the response of Pakistan to the US' demands against the Afghan Taliban can be categorised into three opinion groups. The first group, which perceives Pakistan as a *rent-seeking state*, argues that Pakistani Generals do not cooperate against the Afghan Taliban, because they consider the US policy towards Afghanistan in conflict with Pakistan's strategic interest in Kabul. The second group that perceives Pakistan as an ideological state claims that Pakistan's army did not accept the US demands against the Afghan Taliban, because it considered the Afghan Taliban as strategic partner blocking India's influence in Afghanistan. The third group deems Pakistan to be a security-seeking state, whose authors share the view that Pakistan did not accept the United States' demands due to geo-strategic factors. According to them, a New Delhi friendly regime in Kabul would not only reduce Islamabad's influence in Afghanistan, but also jeopardise its security interest. This article claims that Pakistan's army does not cooperate against the Afghan Taliban, because of the combination of concerns that the United States' presence in Afghanistan will last only as long as their immediate concerns require, capability constraints to accept the United States demands and domestic pressure.

## **Options with the Pakistan in FATA**

The basic rule of engagement between Pakistan and the United States after 9/11 was based on Islamabad's commitment to policy of “zero tolerance” for terrorist activity within its borders. When Al-Qaeda's presence was established in North and South Waziristan in 2003, Pakistan had to take action. It had three options to remove Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries from the tribal areas at that time.

### ***First Option with Pakistan***

Firstly, Pakistan could have sent its forces for counter-terrorism operations to cordon off the areas, used elite Special Forces for a quick surgical strike on accurate intelligence information to either arrest or kill targeted terrorists. Pakistan's Army has frequently used this approach in urban areas, where most of Al-Qaeda's top operatives were arrested including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003), Abu Zubaydah (March 2002), and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (September 2002). All of them were close confidants of Bin Laden and were directly involved in planning the events of 9/11. Top US officials regularly praise Pakistani anti-terrorism effort.

The State Department reports that Islamabad has captured 550 alleged terrorists and their supporters, has transferred more than 400 of these to US custody, including several top suspected Al-Qaeda leaders (Miko, 2005, CRS5, Kronstadt, Jan, 2005). But the FATA region was different from Pakistan's mainland. Islamabad did not administer the region directly, and there were no networks of either police force or intelligence agencies. They are semi-autonomous regions who fiercely guard their autonomy against every external intervention including Pakistan's Army. Pakistan administers the FATA through tribal chiefs who are responsible for law and order in their respective constituencies. The Pakistani state did not have any intelligence and police network in these areas to monitor the movement and growth of Al-Qaeda. While keeping in mind the FATA tribal culture, widespread availability of weapons, tough topography and an established network of Al-Qaeda's sympathisers, Pakistan's Army stepped away from a full-fledged military operation against Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries. It was not in Pakistan's strategic interest to alienate a population of 7 million people for the sake of a few Al-Qaeda sympathisers; therefore, it avoided to launch counter-insurgency military operations.

### ***The second option with Pakistan***

The second option was to allow the US forces to conduct military operations in FATA, which would have been catastrophic for Pakistan domestically. The US forces actually conducted some surgical strikes in South and North Waziristan against Al-Qaeda, but only on a few occasions in September

2008. The US special forces are operating in some tribal areas, but their roles are confined to surveillance and general advice on counter-insurgency: "Pakistan's Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed the ODRP (the Pentagon's representative in the embassy in Islamabad) that it approved a request from the Army's 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOF (Special Operation Command) (FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to Wana, South Waziristan and Miram Shah, North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11 Corps' 9th and 7th Divisions" (WikiLeaks, 10/9/2009).

The US forces and the FIA agents were also part of the surgical strikes conducted in urban areas by Pakistan's security forces but a prominent presence would have inflamed anti-Americanism in FATA and the rest of country. Pakistan knew that any foreign force presence in the FATA would inflame the local tribes against them. It would have been difficult for Musharraf to survive that decision politically to allow the US forces in FATA. He might not only have faced resistance from right-wing political parties, but also from the rank and files of Pakistan's Army, who were already not happy with Musharraf's decision to ally with the United States in the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda: "Musharraf earned the ire of many militants and others in the military when he withdrew the country's support of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001 and fell in line with the United States' war on terrorism." (*Asia Time Online*, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2004).

President Musharraf further tested the commitment of its forces, when it decided to conduct military operations in the FATA against Al-Qaeda under the United States pressure. That decision was considered neither in Pakistan's national interest nor compatible with the Army tradition. The core of Pakistan's Army training is based on religious principles rather than professional one. Its slogan is "Faith, Unity and Discipline", therefore killing a fellow Muslim was very difficult challenge for Pakistan's Army in the FATA. The slain journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, said, "April's operation in South Waziristan raised further questions about discipline in the Army when several officers and soldiers refused to attack on their own people (tribal residents). Several officers were arrested and moved to Rawalpindi and Islamabad to be taken to the task." (*Asia Time Online*, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2004). It was still considered less bad option than the US forces occupation of the FATA. Any permission to the US Special Operation Forces to conduct military operations in FATA would not only have created widespread public support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in FATA, but would have also seriously disturbed a major section of Pakistan's Army who

are ethnically Pashtun, currently deployed in FATA, some even belonging to North and South Waziristan.

### ***Third option with Pakistan***

The third option was a confrontation with the US in case Pakistan refused to cooperate against Al-Qaeda. The US would not have hesitated to take unilateral action against Al-Qaeda and its tribal supporters in FATA. According to the White House, "When states prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the United States, in cooperation with friends and allies, or if necessary, acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies" (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003, p17). The Musharraf regime's decision in the aftermath of 9/11 to join the US against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was just the beginning of a long and treacherous relationship.

In March 2004, when the Bush administration started pressuring Musharraf for military actions in FATA against Al-Qaeda, Pakistan was already in the middle of another serious crisis, when its national hero and nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan confessed on a live national television that he was involved in the proliferation of nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea. He acknowledged his involvement in nuclear proliferation after the CIA Director George Tenet presented some concrete evidence to President Musharraf during his visit to the United States for a General Assembly meeting in September 2003: "Mr. President, if a country like Libya or Iran or, God forbid, an organization like Al Qaeda, gets a working nuclear device and the world learns that it came from your country, I am afraid the consequences would be devastating." (Tenet, 2007).

It is true that some states are declared sponsors of terrorism on less evidence available than there is on Pakistan. When the US forces invaded Iraq, it was on the basis of vague evidence, which later proved to be false. But building a case against Pakistan would not necessitate the CIA to fabricate false evidence that establish links between nuclear proliferation, Al-Qaeda and rogue state elements. These considerations along with the Indian pressure on the United States to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism were in Musharraf's mind when he succumbed to the US pressure to launch military operation in FATA despite domestic repercussions. It would have been a strategic blunder for Pakistan to challenge the United States over the presence of some illegal Al-Qaeda operatives hidden in FATA attacking the United States forces in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda presence in FATA was not only a threat to the United States' homeland security and its forces in Afghanistan, but also to the liberal elements in Pakistan including Pakistan's Army. Al-Qaeda already plotted

two unsuccessful suicide attacks on former President Musharraf and Corps Commander Karachi of Pakistan's Army. This was one basic reason along with the United States' pressure and rewards that motivated Pakistan to flush out Al-Qaeda from FATA, but FATA's autonomous status, the support of some local people to Al-Qaeda and domestic pressure from right-wing political parties forced Musharraf to launch half-hearted military operations which further strengthened them. When Pakistan's Army did conduct military operations, but later made political deals with them, it did not only damage the Army's credibility, but also increased the militant and Al-Qaeda's legitimacy in those areas.

It was Musharraf's second strategic shift to launch military operation in FATA after joining the US war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda after 9/11. The first shift also affected Pakistan domestically, but not as badly as the second one. The reason for that is Afghanistan has a long and porous border with Pakistan (1510 miles) and the Pashtuns live on both sides of the border. The Pashtuns constitute the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, comprising 42% of the population (13.8 million), whereas, in Pakistan, it is the second largest ethnic group, 15% of the population (26.6 million) (ISW, 2013). Therefore whenever there is turmoil in Afghanistan it also affects Pakistan's Pashtun population due to cultural, religious and ethnic similarities. It was clear that after the US military operations in Afghanistan, the Taliban would move across the border in order to take refuge within Pakistan's Pashtun population. In 2001 Pakistan was confident in its capacity to maintain the control of its Pashtun population and therefore decided to support the American operation in Afghanistan (first shift), but it did not properly anticipate the political and strategic repercussions of the military operations conducted in FATA by their own forces (second shift). According to CRS report "In June 2003, in what may have been a response to increased US pressure, Islamabad for the first time in its history sent its armed forces into traditionally autonomous FATA in search of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters who have eluded the US led campaign in Afghanistan." (Miko, 2005, p CRS-6).

### **Military Operations in Pakistan's tribal areas:**

Pakistan's army has conducted several small and large operations in Pakistan's settled and tribal areas against Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani ally Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to meet the US demand of "removal of Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries". TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, openly supports Al-Qaeda and claimed responsibility for several successful and unsuccessful suicide attacks in Pakistan and internationally. As the United States could not defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan without removing the

Taliban government in Kabul, similarly, Pakistan could not destroy Al-Qaeda's network in FATA without taking stringent actions against those who assisted and sheltered Al-Qaeda's members; as stated earlier North and South Waziristan are the two most suitable locations for Al-Qaeda after the Taliban regime in Afghanistan fell, as they meet with almost the same conditions as they had in Afghanistan. In Pakistan it is a serious issue at the lower level to force an officer either in the bureaucracy, police or Army and of course the ISI, to properly implement a decision as taken at the top level, because of their ideological, sectarian and political commitments, and also due to corruption. Pakistan's Army officers usually defy the civilian government's decisions; even field-grade officers, colonels and above, say: 'I am there to serve the state, not the government'. Pakistan's Army has a monopoly on the definition of 'national interest' in Pakistan, particularly on issues related to the security of the state. Pakistan's military operations against Al-Qaeda and TTP can be divided into three categories.

### ***1.1 Partial Commitment (2001-2003):***

The first category of these military operations is the ones carried out when Pakistan supported a certain US military operation in Afghanistan, called "*Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2002)*". It included the deployment of some 100,000 troops on the border with Afghanistan to stop the flow of Al-Qaeda militants and the Taliban to either sides of the border and arrest of 600 "unwanted foreigners". President Musharraf claims: "In December 2001, when Operation Tora Bora caused many al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to flee to Pakistan, I established a net for apprehending them....The Tora Bora net led to the capture of 240 Al-Qaeda operatives belonging to twenty-six different nationalities, the majority from Afghanistan and the Arab countries" (Musharraf, 2006, p.264). US officials were regularly praising and appreciating Pakistan's counter-terrorism cooperation: "According to the US Department of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented levels of counter-terrorism cooperation by allowing the US military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, and deploying tens of thousands of its own security forces to secure the Pakistan-Afghanistan border" (Miko, 2005, pCRS5).

Pakistan's commitment to the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban from 2001 to 2003 can be categorised as a 'partial commitment', because Pakistan's Army deployed on the border arrested Al-Qaeda members and turned a blind eye to Taliban crossing the Durand line. The arrest of Al-Qaeda operatives at that stage was relatively easier for Pakistan, because they did not penetrate the society at the beginning and could easily be identified and arrested, given the ISI's history of working with them in Afghanistan. The main problem at that stage seems to be at the

implementation level. It was difficult for Pakistani officers in the field to arrest or kill a fellow Muslim for the sake of United States. In Pakistan, militants and religious people were – and still are – considered better citizens than liberal members of the society, because the former are ready to fight along with the Army against India and any other force Pakistan's Army considers a worthy opponent. All of a sudden the same 'good citizens' became 'terrorists'; it was difficult for the lower level bureaucracy, who are usually more religious than the elite at the top, to accommodate such a dramatic shift. Even then, Pakistan did manage to arrest an impressive number of Al-Qaeda operatives.

#### **4.2 A Reluctant and suspicious ally (2003-2006):**

One of the key features of the Bush administration's policy that involved the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was to push the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan to the border areas of Pakistan. The United States primarily relied on the forces of the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban on the ground with the help of the CIA and the US Special Operation Forces (Fair, 2009). It was obvious that they would go to Pakistan, especially to its tribal areas, from where they were getting support before 9/11. The United States wanted to use a 'hammer and anvil' strategy to sandwich the Taliban and Al-Qaeda between the US and Pakistani forces; unfortunately neither did the United States properly use the hammer nor did Pakistan provide the required anvil.

The second phase of the military operation started in Pakistan's tribal areas, and implied the arrest and killing of Al-Qaeda members. Pakistan's Army carried out a series of military operations in North and South Waziristan against Al-Qaeda without any major success: "Between 2002 and 2006, Pakistan conducted nearly two dozen major operations against insurgents" (Fair & Seth, 2011). Pakistan's military arm succumbed to the US pressure for military operations, but it was very difficult for them to isolate Al-Qaeda operatives from tribal people. The romantic narrative of Al-Qaeda's "Jihad against the United States" was already widely popular in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The FATA region was already radicalised during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Pakistan with the help of the United States created a strong infrastructure of militants for the Afghan war, which was later used by Al-Qaeda after 9/11. This strategic belt has always been notorious for providing foot soldiers to Pakistan's Army against India and the Islamist forces in Afghanistan. The only factor that motivated these tribes to fight either the Indians in Kashmir or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was 'Islam'; it was not the state of Pakistan. The part of



Kashmir that belongs to Pakistan was invaded by these people, not by the Pakistani Army, in 1948.

The second important factor for Pakistan's failure to root out Al-Qaeda from tribal areas was the confusion and suspicion in Pakistan's Army. Pakistan's military was fighting the United States' war until the Pakistani Taliban started suicide attacks inside Pakistan, only then did it become a Pakistani war. Pakistan's policy makers and officers on the ground who were implementing the decision didn't trust the United States enough to kill some of their own. This situation of uncertainty at the top level damaged Pakistan's credibility at the grass root level. Pakistan's army was launching a military operation one day under the United States pressure, inflicting collateral damage, imposing economic sanctions on the whole tribe, punishing a tribe under the principle of 'territorial responsibility' (it means the tribe of the area is responsible for law and order in its area, if anybody shelters the foreigners, it is the responsibility of the tribe to force them to surrender the foreigners to the government) and then making peace deals with the militants within a period of one month further strengthened the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

This policy of uncertainty and lack of mutual trust between the United States and Pakistan also discouraged the anti-Taliban liberal elements in FATA who were ready to help the government to arrest Al-Qaeda (Wazir, 2014). They later became the prime target for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which helped them to establish their writ in the area. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban killed thousands of tribal elders as of 2017 (South Asia terrorism portal, 2017). All of them are prominent figures who were head of their tribes. When TTP was killing these tribal people, there was not any strong reaction from the government, which was a dangerous political signal to the locals that 'nobody should resist the Taliban, because government is with them covertly' (Wazir, 2014).

The third factor which was the straw that broke the camel's back was Pakistan's government's peace agreements with the tribes who supported and sheltered Al-Qaeda's militants. The spirit of Pakistan's demand was that 'the tribal should not attack the government's installations and personnel in FATA'. At the beginning Pakistan's government demanded that all foreigners should register themselves with the government and stop cross-border activities in Afghanistan, but it soon realised that it was too much to ask for. When the author read the agreements between the Taliban and the government, it was visible that the government was more interested in having peace deals than in the Taliban; therefore, it accepted all demands of the Taliban. At the end of every peace deal, the Taliban were getting their prisoners, compensation for damage after a military operation, and a legitimate position as the representative of the people (Fair & Jones, 2009).

In the meantime, when there was a ceasefire between the government and the Taliban, the latter were killing pro-government tribal chiefs, whereas the government was not taking any step against them. Pakistan's policy of appeasement towards the Taliban and Al-Qaeda encouraged the Taliban to establish their writ throughout the FATA and expand their influence to the settled areas of Pakistan (Abbas, 2013). Pakistan adopted this policy of appeasement because it was persuaded that a policy of military operation is not in its national interest and secondly, it was suspicious of the United States' objectives in Afghanistan.


### 4.3 Maintenance of status quo (2007-2013)

The third phase of the military operations started in mid-2007. The successive failure of Pakistan's military operations to flush out Al-Qaeda and defeat the tribes in FATA created a new militant identity of “Pakistani Taliban”. All the tribal militants in different parts of FATA created an umbrella organisation to coordinate and facilitate each other’s activities in FATA and Pakistani settled areas. The number of suicide attacks in Pakistan's mainland increased from 9 in 2006 to 57 in 2007, including the killing of prominent figures like Ms Benazir Bhutto, Chairperson of Pakistan's largest political party, Pakistan People Party (PPP) as shown in the following graph.

Note: The number of suicide attacks in Pakistan from 2005-2012.

Source; <http://pakistanbodycount.org/analytics>

In 2007, when the militancy expanded from FATA to Pakistan's mainland,



it was the first time when Pakistan's Army started rationalising Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban as a threat to Pakistan's security and stability. The Taliban particularly targeted Pakistan's law enforcement agencies including

the Army, FC, police force and government officials ([www.pakistanbodycount.org](http://www.pakistanbodycount.org), 2013). They also did not spare shopping malls, residential areas, mosques, colleges and media centres. One of the most dangerous arms of the TTP is a group that consists of splinter elements from sectarian and Kashmiri jihadists who shifted from Pakistan's mainland to FATA due to Islamabad's policy of "no infiltration in Kashmir" (Mujeeb, 2013). They are very hostile to the Pakistani state, particularly to its armed forces due to their alliance with the United States and betrayal of Muslim in Kashmir in Afghanistan. These people have a long history of working with the ISI in Kashmir, and are trained enough to stage spectacular attacks in Pakistan's mainland. They attacked the Pakistani Army's General Headquarter (GHQ) when the Chief of Army Staff was also present and fought for many hours (The Nation, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2009). They also destroyed Pakistan's Navy and Air Force latest surveillance aircraft in 2011 as a revenge for the death of Bin Laden. They pose a serious challenge to Pakistan's security forces.

The Pakistani Taliban did not stop only in FATA, when they consolidated their positions in North and South Waziristan; they expanded to Pakistan's settled areas and seriously challenged the writ of state in the Swat valley of Pakistan. Swat is one of the most moderate and beautiful places in Pakistan, situated in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering the FATA region. A faction of TTP led by Mullah Fazlullah occupied the Swat Valley. Pakistan's Army did carry out sporadic operations against the TTP in 2007 and 2008, but did not succeed in defeating the Taliban.

In 2009, when a democratic government came in power through an election in February 2008, the provincial government led by a secular nationalist party Awami National Party (ANP) made a deal with the militants by accepting their demands of installing an Islamic justice system. Even that agreement, however, failed in a month, and Swat suffered another bout of violence. Emboldened by the government's concessions, the Fazlullah-led Taliban overran Mingora in May 2009, the commercial centre of the Swat Valley, paralysing the government. The Taliban then pushed into neighbouring Buner and Shangla districts, only 60 miles from Pakistan's capital city (dawn, 2013). The Taliban advance toward Islamabad rang alarm bells among the government and the military, and caused Pakistan to launch a decisive military operation against Maulana Fazlullah and his fighters" (Khattak, 2012).

Eventually, when the Taliban broke its promise and refused to disarm, Pakistan's army did a massive operation against them, "Pakistani security forces used helicopter gunships, fighter jets, artillery and infantry advances to target militants" (Fair & Jones, 2010). This operation was closely

coordinated with the US. One of key feature of this operation was Internally Displaced People (IDPs); more than 3 million people were displaced. They took refuge in refugee camps and with their relatives. After successful operation, Pakistan's political government successfully rehabilitated all of them and restored peace in Swat valley. Admiral (Mullen) said "If what's happened in Swat over the last six weeks or so is indicative, I'm optimistic". He says "They (Pakistan's army) have learned a good deal." (SCHMITT, 2009). The young Pakistani girl got for Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 Malala Yousufzai belongs to Swat valley. Pakistan's military operation in Swat shows one thing that army does not tolerate the TTP inside the Pakistan's mainland. Pakistan's army recognized the TTP (the bad Taliban) as an internal threat to Pakistan's security and conducted military operations with significant public support.

### **Conclusion**

Pakistan had been giving different kinds of assistance to the United States in the war against Al-Qaeda. It includes operational and logistic assistance for military operations in Afghanistan like deployment of 115,000 troops on the border to stop the flow of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to Pakistan, two bases for military and intelligence purposes in Baluchistan, and ground supply to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan. This kind of cooperation was essential for the successes of the United States' mission in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda. The second kind of support Pakistan had given the United States against Al-Qaeda is a counter-terrorism one. Counter-terrorism assistance includes granting permission to the US Joint Special Operation Forces, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA personnel in Pakistan for raids and intelligence gathering. The US teams in assistance with the Pakistani law enforcement agencies succeeded in arresting key leaders of Al-Qaeda in urban areas including the mastermind of 9/11 Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. It was the result of this kind of cooperation that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abotabad. In tribal areas, Pakistan and the United States not only engage in joint operations against Al-Qaeda, but also use drone strikes frequently, which has badly damaged Al-Qaeda's network in North and South Waziristan. The last kind of cooperation is a military one, when Pakistan sent its forces to tribal areas for the first time in history on the demand of the United States to remove Al-Qaeda's sanctuaries, which backfired by precipitating a fully-fledged tribal-cum-religious insurgency. Pakistan's military operations in FATA on the demand of the United States against Al-Qaeda's affiliated groups inflicted massive cost on the Pakistani military, economy and society.

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