

**THE RISE AND IMPACT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM  
IN PAKISTAN AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION IN AFGHANISTAN  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KPK AND BALOCHISTAN**

*Philosophy*

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**ABSTRACT**

*Pakistan is situated in a region where fundamentalism has been posed, of late, as one of the most threatening questions. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan really began in the 1980s. On the one hand, the military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq, was using religion to justify his rule and was ‘Islamizing’ laws and society. On the other hand, Pakistan had become a base camp for the forces opposing the Afghan revolution. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the Zia allies with US, uses Islam to consolidate his power passes pro-Islamic legislation, and create many madrasahs and his policies created a “culture of jihad” within Pakistan that continues until present day. Recently Islamic fundamentalism has risen as an alternative political phenomenon not only in Pakistan but also in the entire Muslim world. Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is partly a link of this international phenomenon and partly caused by specific local reasons. When analyzing Islamic fundamentalism, one must understand that the religion of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are not one and the same thing. If the teaching of Islam is studied we would know that the best Muslims are the fundamentalists. The fundamentals of Islam are based on peace; indeed the major point of Islam preaches peace. The peoples who are usually described fundamentalist are far from the following the fundamentals of Islamic teachings. On the contrary they totally reject the teachings of Islam or partially deviate from them. Islamic fundamentalism is*

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*now a reactionary, non-scientific movement aimed at returning society to a centuries-old social set-up, defying all material and historical factors. It is an attempt to roll back the wheel of history. Fundamentalism finds its roots in the backwardness of society, social deprivation, a low level of consciousness, poverty, and ignorance. Most of them have seemingly reverted to Pre-Islamic Jahilliya way of extreme loyalty to their groups, clans, or tribes to fanaticism.*

## **DISCUSSION**

On August 14, 1947, a new country named Pakistan was created. This country, contemplated as a separate home for Indian Muslims, could be viewed as: a geographic manifestation of the politics of Indian Muslims as a minority group in the pluralistic Indian society; an expression of a community with a firm belief in a separate social order with its own political power base; and a sovereign state embodying the legacy of Islamic culture, which had developed in India for about eight hundred years. The two Muslim states in south Asia, Pakistan and Bangladesh (the eastern wing of Pakistan in 1947, and a sovereign state since 1971) and the Muslim presence in modern-day India signify the long history of Islamization of India from the Frontier province now Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa in the North to Bengal in the East.

After independence an obvious and major change occurred in the intelligentsia's role in shaping the destiny of Muslims in Pakistan and India. Unlike the developments in British India, the initiative in social, religious and political reform was expected to come from the political leadership and not from religious and social reformers. The issues confronting the Muslims in the two countries were different. In Pakistan, the shape of the social order and the role of religion in politics were to become concerns of both political leadership and the intelligentsia. In India, having become a small and powerless minority the Muslims had to cope with and adjust to the changed reality of living in a "secular" India.

With partition, many organizations split. The entire *Jimat-ul-Ulema-Islam* (JUI) went over to Pakistan while the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind*, remained headquartered in India. The *Jamaat-i-Islami* split and the Indian branch came under the influence of the Nationalist *Deobandis* and accepted and even lauded the secular ideal as a means of preserving minority culture and focused on education and social uplift of the community. The Pakistani branch headed by Maududi, on the other hand, became active in what can be

called Islamic politics, beginning in the 1950's. The ideological polarization of the community between the *Ulama* and the modernist which had divided the community before 1947 continued after 1947 and shaped and nurtured the ideological cross-currents in Pakistan. Its first manifestation was in the constitutional debates. In scores of commission and committees, which set up to review all aspects of Pakistani society, the subject of Islamization was never raised.

After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 following the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistanis experienced an identity crisis. In search of a new source of unity among the four remaining provinces with different languages and cultural norms, Islam provided a viable ideology to unite them as a nation. It was Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) a moving force in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the most secular Pakistan's head's of state visible recognition to the *Ulama* by officially involving them in the Islamization process (**Farooq 1985:151**). He also succumbed to the pressures of the religious groups September 1974 in declaring a movement known as *Ahmadia*, Non-Muslim.

Bhutto's successor, General Zia-ul-Haq fully utilized the process of Islamization to achieve his political ends and sought legitimacy by implementing Islam as an ideology of Pakistan:

General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) made Islamization the social and political order of the country, the cornerstone of his government (**Farooq 1985: 242-249**).

General Zia, with the help of state institutions, weakened the secular and progressive forces and introduced the *Hudood*, *Qisas* and *Diyat* in legal system of Pakistan and Federal Shariat Court was also established:

The only time that Pakistan experienced an intense process of 're – Islamization' was during General Zia ul-Haq's military rule (1977-88), which the USA supported in the context of its opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s (**Saikal 2003:2**).

General Zia received support of the religious scholars to the extent that a group of them turned against elections and parliamentary democracy and favored vesting all powers in the individual who seized power. Islamization in their view was more important than the efficiency of

Government. Then Zia introduced a comprehensive Islamization plan covering religious institutions, educational system, economy and law (**Farooq 1985:257-59**). These measures, in the short term, brought confusion and chaos, and not brought any contribution to improve law and order. That was the period when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Various militant organizations were formed which was supported by United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to counter the Soviet invasion.

Pakistan's fundamentalism was mobilized and made sectarian by the government of General Zia. It also became *Jihadi* and terrorist with a lot of financial support from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Americans were concerned only with winning the war in Afghanistan and defeating the Soviet Union, but the Saudis had ideological and sectarian aims (**Ahmed 2003: 39**).

The US supported *jihād* against Soviet Union in Afghanistan. "According to investigative reports for the Washington Post, over the past 20 years the US has spent millions of dollars producing fanatical schoolbooks which were then distributed in Afghanistan. These books were developed in the early 1980's under a US AID grant to the University of Nebraska-Omaha and its centre in Afghanistan. "The primers, which are filled with talk of *jihād* featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines. They have served since then as the Afghan school system's core curriculum" (**Marwat 2005:1**). This led to the radicalization of Islam as well as through the enhanced interest of the Arab world in the region and the activity of fundamentalist preachers in Pakistan, many receiving funds from Arabian Peninsula:

The Islamic nature of the Afghan resistance highlighted the close relationship between religion and politics and encouraged the establishment of approximately 1,000 Islamic madressas (religious schools) and *Dar-ul-Ulum*. This was done with aid from Middle Eastern countries to provide an ideological base for Afghan *jihād*. The Frontier Post (Peshawar) reported on July 17, 1992, that Rs 5.969 million had been distributed among 42 deeni madressas alone in period 1984-91, from Provincial *Auqaf* Fund. Most Arab donors injected sectarian ideologies into refugees through these religious institutions to gain their own ends... (**Marwat, 2005: 1**)

The Arabian Peninsula led to an enhancement of *Wahhabi* influence

on the sub-continent Muslims. This effort was spearheaded by preachers who collected fund, from Arabs to run *Madrassas* (schools) and other organizations in service of the community. During Afghan *jihad*, the quietist movements became militant, spawning off organization like *Markaz Dawatul-Irshad* (centre of spiritual guidance), and *Harkat-ul-Ansar* (movement of helpers), *Hizbul Mujahideen* come into existence.

Since the major forces fighting in Afghanistan were led by religious groups, their militant character was transferred to Pakistan; many Pakistanis who fought in the Afghan war were the students of *Madrases*... The *Madrases* attending youth become the real militant work force, brainwashed by the word “*jihad*” without knowing against what or whom it was... These militant trends, an easy arms supply, Zia’s controversial Islamic Laws, demands of enforcing the *Sharia* by different sects, and establishment of *Shariat* Courts created a tense atmosphere Sectarian riots broke out several times (**Jalalzai 1988:3**).

In 1985, when different groups of Afghan *Mujhaideen* formed a united front for coping with the Soviet invasion in their country; they also arranged military training facilities for these armies. Three months later, when they could not achieve their political objectives within the frame, the unity was shattered and every party became a separate mercenary army. *Salafi* Group seceded from *Hazb-I-Islami* in Kunar. After fall of Najeeb regime and war between Gulbadeen and Rabbani another group *Dawa Arshad* completed its training. Furthermore, these groups attacked each other’s (Jalalzai 1988:23). Several groups in Pakistan established their private armies such as (**Jalalzai 1988:24**):

- |    |                                  |    |                                 |
|----|----------------------------------|----|---------------------------------|
| 1. | Sepah-e-Sehaba Pakistan          | 2. | Harkat-ul-Ansar                 |
| 3  | Dawat-ul-Arshad                  | 4  | Alkhalid Force                  |
| 5  | Lashker Jhangavi                 | 6  | Sepah-e-Ali                     |
| 7  | Sepah-e-Muhammad Pakistan        | 8  | Sepah-e-Abbas                   |
| 9  | Almukhatar Force                 | 10 | Immamia<br>Student Org.         |
| 11 | Salafi Student Union             | 12 | Sunni Tehrik                    |
| 13 | Khaddam-e-Ahmadia Students Union |    |                                 |
| 14 | Ahl-i-Hadieth Youth Force        | 15 | Mustafavi Student<br>Federation |

The other militant group, *Taliban*, have maintained themselves as a movement under the leadership of Mullah Umar. The *Taliban* phenomenon can only be understood with reference to their origins in the *Madrassas*.

Pakistan's ruling elite and government policies have remained secular since independence. The modernist religious thinking failed to dominate the intellectual landscape. Among the post-independence modernists in Pakistan the most noteworthy is Dr. Fazlur Rahman (1919-1998), a McGill University graduate with a solid background in traditional Islam. He made a substantial contribution to the modernization of Pakistani laws. He drew inspiration from earlier modernists such as Shibli and Iqbal.

Traditional Islam is a major force in Pakistan. The *Deobandis*, *Ahl-i-Hadith* and the *Barelvis* each with a large following are rivals and engage in debates on theological issues. These religious groups have also formed themselves into political parties. *Jamaat-I-Islam's* influence is by far the most widespread because of its large membership. Only a small number of its members are *Madrassa* graduates. The rest represent all strata of society-educated laypersons, professional and non-professionals, coming from lower and middle classes. *Jamaat's* educated membership has played a prominent role at both social and political levels through out the history of Pakistan. It has also gained a foothold in the younger population of colleges and universities. This younger group is an active participant in politics and mobilizing masses to take part in protests and demonstrations against the government. It has remained persistent in its demand for the establishment of an Islamic State. This reformist group wishes to bring about social change through peaceful means.

*Madrassas*, centre of traditional education in Pakistan, which are run by various *Ulama* belonging to *Deobandis*, *Barelvis*, *Ahl-i-Hadith*, *Shias* and other school of thought, are growing rapidly in number with or without the government support. In 1957-58 there were only 119 *Madrassas* in West Pakistan with 4790 students. However in 1988 the total numbers of *Madrassas* in the country were 2891 having 470,409 students (**Rahman 2002:313**). There breakdown, sect and province-wise was as follows in table 1: (**Rahman 2000: 11**).

**Table 1: Breakdown of Madrassas**

Province	Number of Students	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahl-i-Hadith	Shia	Others	Total of Provi
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Punjab	206,778	590	548	118	21	43	1320
NWFP	88,147	6631	32	5	2	8	678
Sindh	71,639	208	61	6	10	6	291
Balochistan	40,390	278	34	3	1	31	347
Azad Kashmir	43,447	51	20	2	-	3	76
Islamabad	7,858	51	20	-	2	3	76
Northern Areas	12,150	60	2	27	11	3	103
<b>Total of Sects</b>	<b>470,409</b>	<b>1869</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>1616</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>2891</b>

In 1995, the number increased to 3906, which is still increasing. The *Madrassahs* teach Arabic as main subject but use Urdu as medium of instruction in Punjab, urban Sindh, some parts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, Balochistan and Azad Kashmir, however regional language are also used for instructions.

Some *Madrassahs* are affiliated to central organization, which prescribe a uniform curriculum and system of examinations for all. The major organizations are as follows (**Rahman 2000: 11**):

1. *Wafaq-al-Madaris al-Arabiyyah*. This was created by the *Deobandis* in 1959 with its central office in Multan.
2. *Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabiyyah*. This was created by *Barelvis* in 1959 with its central office in Dera Ghazi Khan. The *Barelvis* address themselves to the peasants and ordinary people and do not mind the excessive adoration of the saints, which is part of folk Islam in Pakistan.
3. *Wafaq ul-Madaris ul-Salfiya*. This was created by *Ahl-i-Hadith* in Faisalabad in 1955. They are highly fundamentalist rejecting the cult of saints and rituals. They are also called *Wahhabis* in common parlance in Pakistan.
4. *Wafaq ul-Madaris ul-Shia*. This was created by majority *Shia* sect, the believer in twelve imams (*Ithna Asharis*) in Pakistan in 1959. the head office in Lahore (Fieldwork).

5. *Raba ul-Madaris*. This was setup by the *Jamat-i-Islami*. They teach modern subjects and often enable the students to take the ordinary state examinations along with religious ones.

All *Madrassahs* are not affiliated to the central organization. The detailed figure given in 1979 report as see in table 2 (**Rahman 2000: 11**) and fresh report in table 3: (**Rahman 2000: 17**).

**Table 2**

Province	Barelvis	Deobandis	Ahl-I-Hadith	Shi a	Un-known	Total of Province
Punjab	148	96	65	10	677	996
Sindh	40	67	1	3	269	338
NWFP	16	69	3	-	130	218
Balochistan	14	20	-	-	135	169
<b>Total</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1211</b>	<b>1763</b>

**Source Government Report on Madrassahs 1979 Annexure-14**

**Table 3**

Province	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahl-i-Hadith	Shia	Others	Total of Provinces (1988)*	Total of Provinces (2000)**
Punjab	590	548	118	21	43	1320	3100
NWFP	631	32	5	2	8	678	1200
Sindh	208	61	6	10	6	291	900 (+300 in FATA)
Balochistan	278	34	3	1	31	347	700
Azad Kashmir	51	20	2	-	3	76	Not given
Islamabad	51	20	-	2	3	76	100
Northern Areas	60	2	27	11	3	103	150

Girls' Madrassahs	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	Not given	448
<b>Total of Sects</b>	<b>1869</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>2891</b>	<b>6898 (102 not accounted for)</b>

Source: \*Report Madrassas 1988.

\*\**The State of Pakistan's Children 2000 (Islamabad: SPARC, 2001): 53.*

According to a report by Islamabad's Institute of Policy Studies, Pakistan has 6761 religious seminaries where over a million young men are taking religious training. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has given out similar numbers in its report. But Herald (November 2001) says: 'According to the Interior Ministry, there are some 20,000 Madrassahs in the country with nearly 3 million students'. In 1947, West Pakistan had only 245 seminaries. 1988, they increased to 2861 between 1988 and 2000, this increase comes out to be 136 percent the largest number of seminaries are *Deobandi*, at 64 percent, followed by *Barelvi*, at 25 percent. Only 6 percent are *Ahl-i-Hadith*. But the increase in the number of *Ahl-i-Hadith* seminaries or *Madrassahs* has been phenomenal, at 131 percent, going up from 134 in 1988 to 310 in 2000' (Ahmed 2003: 40).

According to Kaled Ahmed in his Book Review in Daily Times dated June 21, 2009, he says: "According to an estimate in Jang (January 6, 2006), there were 11,221 religious seminaries (madrassas) in Pakistan in the year 2005. This number had grown from 6,761 in 2000. This meant that in the five years that also saw the terrorist attack of 9/11, the apostatising seminaries had almost doubled in Pakistan. There were 448 *madrassas* for women too." He further adds that, "The largest number of *madrassas*, 8,191, belonged to *Wifaqul Madaris Arabiya*, 1,952 to *Tanzimul Madaris* and 381 to *Wifaqul Madaris* Shia. The majority seminaries are *Deobandi*. For instance, in Punjab 444,156 pupils are *Deobandi* as opposed to 199,733 *Barelvi*, 34,253 *Ahle Hadith* and 7,333 *Shia*. The largest number of *madrassas* is not in Lahore but Bahawalpur, then in Lahore, in Bahawalnagar and Faisalabad." According to Maryam Hussain in daily Times Islamabad dated March 22, 2011:

"Top bosses of the Religious Affairs Ministry confessed before a National Assembly standing committee here on Tuesday that Pakistan

was the only Muslim country where “no reliable data about exact numbers of *deeni madaris* (religious seminaries) is available”. Ministry officials, summoned by the NA body on religious affairs for a briefing on proposed amendments to the law to regulate the working of *madrassas*, said that 10,482 seminaries have so far been registered throughout Pakistan. According to copy of the briefing given to the NA body, the ministry officials said that claims by any agency in Pakistan as to the exact numbers of religious schools were mere ‘guesses’ and no reliable data was available.

After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan more than five million Afghan refugees that fled to Pakistan and settled in camps in Balochistan and the Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (formerly NWFP). Millions of refugees fleeing the violence in Afghanistan flooded across the border in the 1980s and a number of *Madrassahs* were set up to educate them and their number was increased massively in Balochistan and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa.

Thousands of *madrassas* were setup to house and educate the refugees and the rural poor for the two provinces. Funding for these *madrassas* came from the central government and from a steady wave of funding from Saudi Arabia... The JUI, which, prior to 1970, had been an apolitical religious and educational movement, setup many of these schools in Balochistan and the NWFP. **(Rashid, Taliban, 89)**

These *Madrassahs* are playing a major role in increasing literary in rural areas, in developing of Muslim consciousness, and providing education to the masses through teaching and through their interpretation of Islamic law by writing *Fatwas* (authentic opinion on point of law). Through their newsletters, and magazines, they also disseminate their views on religious, social and political matters. Majority of the students in *Madrassahs* are small children, memorizing the Holy Qur’an. In 8<sup>th</sup> class the *Dars-i-Nizami* is taught. Between 1982 and 1987 whereas 371, 905 students had read the Qur’an without understanding it (*Nazerah*), only 45,691 had got *Shahadat-I-Almiyah* award. The University Grants Commission/ Higher Education Commission in Pakistan have recognized *Shahadat-I-Almiyah* as equal to M.A. Islamic Studies/Arabic. The final degree, which is equal to M.A. Arabic or Islamic Studies, is used only for teaching purpose. The levels of *Madrassahs* education correspond to the level of mainstream state education as given in table 3: **(Rahman 2000:11).**

**Table 3:**

Level	Stage	Class	Duration	Award	Equivalent
Ibtadaayih	Nazra/Hifz Tajweed-o-Qirat	1 – 5	4 – 5 years	Shahdat-ul-Tahfeez-ul-Quran-al-Kareem	Primary (5 <sup>th</sup> Class)
Mutawassata	Hifz/Tajweed etc.	6 – 8	3 years	Shahadat-ul-Mutawasita	Middle (6748 <sup>th</sup> Classes)
Sania Amma	Tehtani	Oola & Sanvia	2 years	Shahadat-ul-Sanviat-ul-Amma	Matriculation (10 <sup>th</sup> Calss)
Sania Khassa	Tehtani	Salasa & Rabiah	2 years	Shadat-ul-Saniat-ul-Khassa	F.A. (12 <sup>th</sup> Class)
Aliya	Mauquf Alay: Khamisa & Sadisa	Khamisa & Sadisa	2 years	Shadat-ul-Aliya	B.A. (14 <sup>th</sup> Class)
Almiya	Daura-I-Hadit Sabia & Samina	Sabia & Samina	2 years	Shadat-ul-Almyia Fil Uloom-e-Arabia Wal Islamia	M.A. Arabic and Islamic Studies

*Source: Field research as different names are used for the same level in different writings on the madrassahs, an attempt has been made to introduce them above.*

Although, *Madrassahs* have been a source of learning, creating scholars, several people and spread Islam, these examples indicate what they now often teach: divisiveness and dependence on handouts. Unfortunately, the proliferation of *Madrassahs* in Pakistan since 1977 has contributed to the sectarian divide. Since religious groups led the major forces fighting in Afghanistan, their militant character was transferred to Pakistan; many Pakistani who fought in the Afghan war were the product of *Madrassahs*. As the character of these institutions changed from religious to political, their aim increasingly became political power. They are flexing their muscles, as they have tasted victory in Afghanistan. The way to deal them is not to crush them by force but to educate children and find them jobs as:

Indeed, in the most populous province of Punjab as well as the NWFP, a large number of young militant *Madrassah* students are people who are taking to the politics of the militant religious rights because they have been cheated of their rights. The upper echelons on

liberals and the leftists, who should have favoured Urdu and indigenous languages of the people, have generally favoured English. While this keeps religious lobby at bay for the present, it creates ground for a future struggle for power. The masses, deprived of elitist jobs for which English is required, deprived of respect which comes from being educated, deprived of their rights, deprived of power may rise to revolt to wrest power out of the hands the English-using elite **(Rahman 2002: 163)**

In the last few years, it seems that the image of Islam in the world has taken a beating. There is a growing impression in the West and perhaps elsewhere that Islam stands for militancy, extremism and rigidity. Ever since the fall of Soviet-led communist block, terrorism has emerged as the number one enemy for many countries. Unfortunately, in their perception much of terrorist is associated with Muslim groups. In particular, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 handled the American attitude like no other recent event.

Relations between the ‘West’ and ‘the domain of Islam’ are now tense, to say the least. The September 11, 2001 events not only shockwaves through the Muslim world, sharply escalating differences that were already there. The relations are both complex and multidimensional, containing elements of conflict and cooperation, perception and misconception, and cultural and social differences **(Saikal 2003:01)**.

Since then, the US-led war against terrorism has already targeted two Muslim countries-Afghanistan and Iraq-and this in turn has fuelled unprecedented anti Americanism in the Islamic world. There has been talk of a Clash of Civilizations and Religions, even a new crusade giving rise to the perception amongst some Muslim that the Islamic world is under siege. It is evident that the West and other countries are concerned about the growth of terrorism in some Muslim circles (although terrorism is not confined to Muslim alone). Everyone agrees that terrorism is bad and must be condemned. There is need to adopt a global strategy for combating terrorists. The basic causes of terrorism on sectarian violence in Pakistan are **(Jalalzai 1988: 373)**:

1. The Afghan war and training facilities.
2. Religious institutions and their syllabus
3. Iranian revolution and their policies.

4. Foreign Aid (Saudi, Iran and Gulf States).
5. Transportation of arms.
6. Religious Intolerance.
7. The role of foreign agencies.
8. The role of NGOs.
9. Sectarian literature.
10. Government role.
11. Narco trade.
12. Unemployment.
13. Privatization of Tourism
14. The Taliban movement.
15. War in Kashmir.
16. Politicians role.
17. Sajada Nashin's role.
18. Campus politics.

After the revolution in Afghanistan the US and Arab world provided enormous funds to the Afghan *Jihadi* groups. They caught roots in Pakistan, glowed the fire of militancy, sectarianism, fundamentalism, lawlessness and terrorism. The gruesome killings and other organized crime, all committed in the name of Islam, by sophisticated and highly trained militia. Consequently a new kind o religious terrorism was introduced in the country.

In traditional usage '*Madrassa*' meant a centre of higher education of scholarship, teaching and research. The *Madrassahs* have been a source of learning, producing scholars who served people and spread Islam. In modern usage '*madrassa*' has acquired negative meaning, it has come to denote a centre of indoctrination in bigotry and violence and divisiveness. Unfortunately, the proliferation of *Madrassahs* in Pakistan since 1977 has contributed to sectarian divide and militancy.

The themes of *Jihad* and *Shahdat* clearly distinguish the pre-Islamization period curricula and text-books, and the post-1979 curricula and text-books openly eulogies *Jihad* and *Shahadat* and urge students to become *Mujahids* and martyrs (Nayyer 2003: 82).

The *Madaris* sponsored by the Arab world usually import religious as well as temporal education to the Muslim youths. Through educational institutions they carried their message all over the country. The moral and financial support from the Arab world encouraged to propagate their ideas to the remotest areas of our country and also in the other parts of the Muslim world.

Other educational networks exist in a clearly neofundamentalist-context. They are financed directly or indirectly by the petro-dollars, often

within the framework of world Muslim League. These institutes have the benefit of up-to-date technology (e.g. Computer science) but the content of teaching is based entirely on the reformist fundamentalism. Most of the students, new intellectuals, are thus transformed into preachers and *Mullahs*. Their approach to modern world is akin to that of the old-time Christian Missionaries “learn the other culture the better to fight against it”. Language and science are taught in regrettably acknowledging way. These institutes and research centers have become bustling sites of intense activity with publications, conferences, colloquia and seminars. They deal the whole society and the message is thus typically neo-fundamentalist. The course studied during Afghan war was only of *jihad* as:

The books included much unnecessary material and were not written with the purpose of education in mind. They were rather designed for ideological propaganda. At the primary level the material in the mathematics books featured problems such as:

If out of 10 atheist, were killed by 1 Muslim, 5 would be left.

5 guns+5 guns= 10 guns

15 bullets – 10 bullets = 5bullets, etc.(**Marwat 2005: 01**)

The society of Pakistan has now mostly divided on sectarian basis. It seems that the Islamic qualities of compassion and tolerance have been forgotten, and even negated, by some of those who have lately assumed the mantle of champions of Islam. They portray a vengeful Islam. Their language is invariably harsh and threatening. It is no surprise that sectarianism have so greatly smashed the image of Islam in the world. Militancy has emerged as a result of such religious preaching.

Fundamentalism became most of the abused of words. It is equated with extremism. If the teaching of Islam is studied we would know that the best Muslims are the fundamentalists. The fundamentals of Islam are based on peace; indeed the major point of Islam preaches peace. The peoples who are usually described fundamentalist are far from the following the fundamentals of Islamic teachings. On the contrary they totally reject the teachings of Islam or partially deviate from them. Most of them have seemingly reverted to Pre-Islamic *Jahilliya* way of extreme loyalty to their groups, clans, or tribes to fanaticism.

Pakistan was Islamised gradually but when it reached a peak in this process in 1980s, the country became vaguely aware of an extremism

that the west called fundamentalism. When the international media began using the word there was an immediate reaction against it. The cleric and the intellectual both thought it an attack on Islam and began defending Islam instead of worrying about the growing extremism at home (**Ahmed 2003:33**).

## **CONCLUSION**

In Pakistan, the successive military regimes, which interrupted the democratic process, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and subsequent influx of refugees has greatly affected Pakistan and have contributed to social and political unrest in the country. It has also produced a number of religious organizations and some of them have also militant groups which have great impact on country's social and political aspect. The socio-political decline, sectarian violence, and regional conflicts have added to the confusion and made the country difficult to govern. It is only in the reign of such Military Dictators like the late General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) that the religious organization was exploited. During this period Zia-ul-Haq exploited various sectors of Islam and made them fight against each other. On the other hand, these organizations were supported by Saudi government and America got strengthened and strengthened economically and consequently politically also. Zia gave full support to these organisations and thus with the government patronage it emerged as one of the most powerful movement in Pakistan. Consequently, it launched many of its objects and aims in the shape of small organizations. Furthermore, in some of the *Madrasahs*, the students became military soldiers. These people emerged as Taliban and its exploitation continued in that shape particularly in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa and Balochistan.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Before things get worse there is need of sober rethinking and reconsideration of attitude. The first-ever declaration by Prophet Mohammad (SAW) in most piercing words, equating the sanctity of human life, honour and property with that of holiest of the holy in Islam, laid down in the history of mankind, the foundation stone of a just, humane, judicious and virtuous society, an Islamic society. The Prophet of Islam had in unequivocal words enunciated that the killer of an innocent soul was throwing himself out of the fold of Islam by committing an act of infidelity. A society could claim to be Islamic only when it preserves the sanctity of human life, honour and property, otherwise not.

Any venture which may expose the life, honour and property of the members of society to the ravages of armed conflict and thereby disturb its internal peace and security or let the difference of opinion or conflict of interest develop into blood feuds whether among individuals, groups or sections was strongly condemned by the Holy Prophet (SAW). He declared: "whosoever commits armed aggression against us does not belong to us". The words are unambiguous. The founder of Islam refuses to accept the claim of an aggressor standing in arms against Muslim society to be a member of Muslim community.

The prerequisite for an objective analysis of sectarianism, fundamentalism and terrorism is to abandon the prevailing culture of victimhood. Gunning down fellow human being in the name of Islamic preaching is a great sin. The Prophet Muhammad had pardoned his enemies on the eve of victory in Makkah. He did not take revenge and would rather deter aggression. The image and message of Islam in the early days of the Caliphate facilitated widespread of Islam because the Non Muslims were impressed by the humane characteristics of Islam, which were based on socio-economic egalitarianism, tolerance towards the minorities and universal brotherhood. It is imperative that Muslims must present the real and true image of Islam by discouraging militancy and violence.

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